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Recent Developments: Louisiana Medical Malpractice 
Law 
Natalie J. Dekaris* 
Michael C. Mims∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Medical malpractice remains one of the most heavily litigated 
areas of the law in Louisiana.1 One of the biggest developments seen 
in the field over the past few years is the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, reaffirming the 
constitutionality of the State’s statutory cap on damages in medical 
malpractice cases.2 This Article discusses the holding of Oliver and 
also explores recent developments in Louisiana medical malpractice 
law related to prescription, expert witnesses and summary judgment, 
damages, informed consent, medical review panels, the standard of 
care, and the Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF). 
II. OLIVER V. MAGNOLIA CLINIC AND THE LOUISIANA SUPREME 
COURT’S UPHOLDING OF THE CAP 
Louisiana’s cap on damages for medical malpractice actions is 
set forth in the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) at Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42.3 Louisiana’s cap was adopted 
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 1. As of November 9, 2013, a Westlaw search of (MEDICAL HOSPITAL 
DOCTOR PHYSICIAN SURGEON NURS! /s MALPRACTICE) in the database 
“LA (State & Fed.)” for all dates after January 1, 2011 reveals 595 reported cases. 
 2. Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012). See also Arrington v. 
ER Physician Grp., Inc., 110 So. 3d 193 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2013), cert. denied, 111 
So. 3d 1011 (La. 2013); Taylor v. Clement, 110 So. 3d 199 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2013), cert. denied, 111 So. 3d 1011 (La. 2013). 
 3. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42(B) provides, in pertinent 
part: “(1) The total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to or 
death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits as provided 
in R.S. 40:1299.43, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus interest 
and cost.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B). 
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in 1975 “and remains relatively unchanged since its inception.”4 
Over the years, Louisiana’s cap has faced several constitutional 
challenges.5 The Louisiana Supreme Court undertook one such 
challenge in the recent case Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic.6 
In Oliver, the plaintiffs alleged that a nurse practitioner failed to 
correctly and timely diagnose a child’s neuroblastoma, resulting in 
serious injuries.7 At trial, a jury found that the defendant was 
negligent and awarded damages of approximately $10 million.8 The 
plaintiffs requested a declaration that the MMA’s cap on damages 
was unconstitutional, which the trial court denied.9 On appeal, the 
Oliver plaintiffs argued that the cap: (1) deprived victims of their 
right to an adequate remedy at law and (2) violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by arbitrarily and capriciously discriminating on 
the basis of physical condition.10 On remand from the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal agreed with the 
plaintiffs, reversed the trial court, and declared the cap 
unconstitutional.11 After granting writs, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court reversed the Third Circuit and reinstated the holding of the 
trial court.12 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its 1992 holding 
in Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hospital of Dillard University, when it 
last addressed the constitutionality of the cap.13 The Court explained 
that the right of malpractice victims to sue for damages was not a 
fundamental constitutional right, and therefore the State was 
required only to demonstrate a legitimate state objective that would 
                                                                                                             
 4. Bradley R. Belsome, Cap Conundrum, PHYSICIAN INSURER, Fourth 
Quarter 2012, at 22 n.2, available at http://www.piaa.us/docs/PI/PI_4th_2012.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/V8AD-U8TB] (archived Mar. 11, 2014) (“The act was amended 
in 1984 to remove future medical care and related benefits from being within its 
coverage.” (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.43)). 
 5. See, e.g., Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517 
(La. 1992). 
 6. Oliver, 85 So. 3d 39. 
 7. Id. at 41. 
 8. Id. (awarding $6 million in general damages, $629,728.24 in past medical 
expenses, $3,358,828 in future medical expenses, and $33,000 to the patient’s 
father and $200,000 to the patient’s mother for loss of consortium). 
 9. Id. at 42. 
 10. Id. at 43. 
 11. Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 71 So. 3d 1170 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011). Three 
judges dissented, opining that the cap was constitutional under the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s holding in Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hospital of Dillard 
University, 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992). 
 12. Oliver, 85 So. 3d at 50. 
 13. 607 So. 2d 517. 
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be furthered by the discrimination.14 The Oliver Court then 
explained why the cap furthered a legitimate state objective: 
This “quid pro quo” acknowledged in Butler is just as 
constitutionally sound today as it was when we addressed it in 
1992 insofar as the same objective exists now as at the time of 
the legislation’s inception in 1975; i.e., the legislature acted to 
combat the rising insurance premiums in an inherently risky 
industry in order to avoid a healthcare crisis in this state. Both 
now and then, malpractice claims exceeding the cap’s 
monetary limit would effectively increase the probability that 
health care providers would not have medical malpractice 
insurance sufficient to pay for these uncapped damages. The 
result would be an underfunded, perhaps insolvent system of 
recovery for malpractice victims. Any discrimination resulting 
from the cap, while unfortunate, substantially furthers a 
legitimate state interest, making the “imperfect balance” 
“reasonable.”15 
In upholding the cap, the Court emphasized that it only 
possessed the authority to review whether the cap violated the 
constitution—“any other perceived infirmity,” such as the Oliver 
plaintiffs’ argument that the cap prevented injured victims from ever 
being made whole, “is to be addressed by the legislature.”16 
Soon after handing down its opinion in Oliver, on April 12, 
2013, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied all writ applications in 
the consolidated cases of Arrington v. Galen-Med and Taylor v. 
Clement, two other Third Circuit cases involving the alleged 
unconstitutionality of the cap.17 In light of these writ denials, the 
Supreme Court will likely not entertain challenges to the 
constitutionality of the cap in the near future. 
III. PRESCRIPTION 
Another heavily litigated area of Louisiana medical malpractice 
law is prescription, which presents a unique set of challenges. 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 provides the prescriptive 
period applicable to medical malpractice actions.18 Under the 
                                                                                                             
 14. Oliver, 85 So. 3d at 44–45. 
 15. Id. at 45 (citations omitted). 
 16. Id. at 46. 
 17. See Arrington v. ER Physician Grp., Inc., 110 So. 3d 193 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2013); Taylor v. Clement, 110 So. 3d 199 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2013). 
 18. That statute provides in relevant part: 
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician . . . 
whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out 
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Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 9:5628, medical malpractice actions are subject to 
both a traditional one-year prescriptive period and a separate, unique 
three-year prescriptive period.19 The three-year prescriptive period is 
notable because it is not subject to interruption under contra non 
valentem’s discovery rule.20 Also unique to medical malpractice 
actions is the fact that only a complaint filed with the PCF will serve 
to suspend prescription.21 These distinct rules render issues of 
prescription common in medical malpractice cases, including issues 
related to the commencement, suspension, and interruption of 
prescription. 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of commencement of 
prescription in Dingler v. Heart Clinic of Louisiana.22 There, the 
Court held that the patient, who suffered a heart attack the same day 
that he was sent home from the hospital after stress tests, had 
sufficient information to begin the running of prescription on his 
claim that the healthcare provider failed to properly diagnose his 
condition and admit him to the hospital immediately.23 The court 
refused to adopt the plaintiff’s argument that it was not until after he 
obtained a second opinion as to the advisability of his returning to 
employment, necessitating another stress test and inevitably 
highlighting the disparity in the way the stress tests were 
administered, that he was alerted to the possibility that the former 
test was not properly done.24 
Similarly, in Davidson v. Glenwood Resolution Authority, Inc.,25 
a plaintiff was deemed to have constructive notice that the metal 
                                                                                                             
 
of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date 
of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date 
of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to 
claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events 
such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from 
the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (2008). 
 19. See, e.g., Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 48 (La. 2007). 
 20. Id. at 69 (“We therefore reaffirm our holding in Hebert that both the one-
year and three-year periods set forth in LSA–R.S. 9:5628 are prescriptive [not 
preemptive], with the qualification that the contra non valentem type exception to 
prescription embodied in the discovery rule is expressly made inapplicable after 
three years from the act, omission, or neglect.”). 
 21. See Bush v. Nat’l Health Care of Leesville, 939 So. 2d 1216 (La. 2006); 
LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226 (La. 1998). 
 22. 113 So. 3d 269 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2013). 
 23. Id. at 270. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 108 So. 3d 345 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013). 
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object in his abdominal cavity was likely related to the surgery 
performed by the defendant–physician.26 The court dismissed the 
patient’s argument that he did not learn that he had a claim against 
the doctor until specifically informed that the piece of metal was 
from the retractor used during the surgery.27 The surgery occurred 
on April 6, 2006, and the evidence established that as early as July 
12, 2006, the plaintiff 
could feel a ‘square corner’ in his abdomen and knew that 
there was something that should not be there. He saw . . . his 
primary physician, but the test ordered by [the physician] did 
not find anything. On August 15, 2006, a CT scan taken after 
an automobile accident revealed the presence of the metal 
object.28 
The ER physician at that time indicated that he advised the plaintiff 
to follow up with his physician about the metal object.29 The 
radiologist who first noted the presence of the metal object on the 
CT scan also contacted the surgeon, who in turn made several 
attempts to contact the plaintiff.30 Then, in September 2006 another 
physician noted the presence of the metal object on an x-ray but 
informed the plaintiff that he believed that it was probably the 
plaintiff’s penile implant.31 However, the Second Circuit noted that, 
at that time, the plaintiff knew that his penile implant had been 
removed.32 
A key holding regarding suspension of prescription in medical 
malpractice cases can be found in the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center.33 There, the 
Court held that the dismissal, rather than notification of dismissal, of 
a proposed complaint of malpractice for failure to appoint an 
attorney–chairman begins the running of the 90-day grace period in 
which prescription is suspended.34 In Turner, the PCF complaint 
was filed August 20, 2009.35 On May 24, 2010, the PCF sent the 
claimant a “nine month letter” warning of impending dismissal per 
the MMA’s requirement that an attorney–chairperson be appointed 
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. at 351. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 108 So. 3d 60 (La. 2012). 
 34. Id. at 67. 
 35. Id. at 61. 
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within one year of filing the complaint.36 The MMA further 
provides that this “nine month letter” must be sent to the claimant 90 
days in advance of dismissal.37 Then, on August 25, 2010, the PCF 
sent the claimant a letter advising that the complaint was 
dismissed.38 The claimant thereafter filed suit on November 23, 
2010—within 90 days of the PCF’s letter notifying the claimant of 
the dismissal but more than 90 days from the one-year anniversary 
of the filing of the PCF complaint.39 The trial court sustained the 
defendant’s exception of prescription, but the Second Circuit 
reversed.40 The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s judgment, 
holding that, by operation of law, dismissal occurs one year from the 
date that the request for medical review panel is filed.41 
However, the Supreme Court in Turner also recognized that 
there may be instances where 90 days from the date of the “nine 
month letter” is a longer period than one year from the date of the 
PCF complaint (i.e., when the PCF does not timely send the “nine 
month letter”), and there may be instances where 90 days from the 
date of a timely sent “nine month letter” will be shorter than the one-
year period (i.e., where those months include months with 31 
days).42 The Court determined that “in the few instances where the 
one year period and the [90] days from nine months period are 
different and one would maintain the action, that interpretation must 
be followed.”43 
In the recent case of In re Robinson,44 the Second Circuit also 
addressed suspension of prescription by holding that filing a request 
for a medical review panel with the PCF will not suspend the 
running of prescription.45 Rather, the Division of Administration is 
the proper entity with which to file a request for a medical panel 
review.46 Filing in any other venue is invalid and without effect.47 
In addition, according to the Supreme Court’s recent 
pronouncement in Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc.,48 if a non-
healthcare provider is a joint tortfeasor with a healthcare provider, 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c) (2008). 
 37. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c). 
 38. Turner, 108 So. 3d at 64. 
 39. Id. at 62. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 67. 
 42. Id. at 65. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re Robinson, No. 47,380, 2013 WL 163735 (La. Ct. App. 2d Jan. 16, 
2013). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *6. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 120 So. 3d 678 (La. 2013). 
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the provision of the MMA that suspends the running of prescription 
against a healthcare provider during the pendency of a timely filed 
medical review panel complaint will be applied to suspend the 
running of prescription on the claim against the non-healthcare 
provider.49 
Issues related to interruption of prescription have also developed 
over the past few years. In Santiago v. Tulane University Hospital & 
Clinic, an amended petition and supplemental PCF complaint filed 
more than three years after the alleged malpractice were deemed not 
to relate back to the time of the filing of the original complaint.50 
Also, the catch-all provision of the amended petition, incorporating 
by reference all allegations contained in the original petition, 
precluded the amended petition from superseding the original 
petition; thus, the original petition interrupted prescription despite 
the fact that the amended petition withdrew the sole claim of the 
original petition.51 
In Santiago, the plaintiff timely filed a medical malpractice 
complaint against a physician, a hospital, and an unidentified x-ray 
technician, alleging that she was dropped or improperly restrained 
during postoperative testing while still under general anesthesia.52 
The panel found no breach of the standard of care, and the patient 
filed a post-panel lawsuit.53 More than three years after the alleged 
malpractice, the patient amended her lawsuit to add new physicians, 
new radiologist technologists, and nurses.54 Significantly, the 
amended petition alleged that the newly added technologists and 
nurses were directly responsible for the plaintiff’s fall, rather than 
the original defendant–physician.55 The amended pleading also set 
forth completely new negligence allegations against the original 
defendant–physician, alleging that he was at fault for failing to 
diagnose and report her fracture, failing to prevent further harm, and 
falsifying operative and x-ray reports.56 
All of the named physicians then filed an exception of 
peremption,57 arguing that all claims against the original defendant–
physician should be dismissed because the original PCF complaint 
and petition against him could not suspend prescription where no 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 690. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008). 
 50. 115 So. 3d 675 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013). 
 51. Id. at 686–87. 
 52. Id. at 678. 
 53. Id. at 678–79. 
 54. Id. at 679. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The Court noted that the pleading should have been styled as an exception 
of prescription. Id. 
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specific allegations were lodged against him (apparently due to the 
retroactive superseding effect that the amended petition arguably 
had).58 The newly added physicians also sought dismissal because 
they were not named as defendants until more than three years after 
the alleged malpractice.59 The trial court granted the exception and 
dismissed all claims contained in all petitions.60 On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit found that all claims filed in the amended and 
supplemental petition were prescribed as a matter of law because the 
relation-back principles of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 
1153 do not interrupt prescription in medical malpractice cases.61 
The court relied on Borel v. Young,62 reasoning that only the more 
specific provisions of the MMA apply to the exclusion of the more 
general provisions on suspension and interruption of prescription.63 
As for the original claim against the Santiago plaintiff’s original 
defendant–physician, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the catch-all 
language of the amended petition, incorporating by reference all the 
allegations contained in the original petition, constituted a 
pronouncement of the plaintiff’s intent to preserve the allegations 
against the physician.64 This reasoning was in spite of the fact that 
the only allegation against the physician in the original petition was 
responsibility for the fall, and the amended petition deleted all 
references to the physician’s responsibility for the fall.65 The Fourth 
Circuit found that dismissal of the plaintiff’s original claim against 
the original physician would have been proper as superseded by the 
plain language of the amended petition but for the amended 
petition’s catch-all provision.66 It therefore found that the trial court 
erred in dismissing the original fall-related claim against the original 
defendant–physician.67 
Lastly, the Third Circuit recently held in In re Rideaux68 that 
when there are two defendants named in a PCF complaint, the 
claimant must pay the $100 filing fee per named defendant to 
interrupt prescription or the filing is invalid, even if one defendant is 
later voluntarily dismissed.69 In that case, a claimant filed a 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 680. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 684. 
 62. Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2007). 
 63. Santiago, 115 So. 3d at 680–82. 
 64. Id. at 686–87. 
 65. Id. at 686. 
 66. Id. at 686–87. 
 67. Id. 
 68. No. 12-1096, 2013 WL 811628 (La. Ct. App. 3d Mar. 6, 2013). 
 69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(c) (2008). 
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proposed complaint of malpractice against two defendants but 
submitted only one $100 filing fee.70 The PCF immediately notified 
the plaintiff that she had 45 days to submit the correct payment 
($200) or the original filing would be invalid.71 The plaintiff failed 
to submit the additional filing fee.72 One year later, the plaintiff 
notified the PCF of her desire to dismiss the claim against one of the 
defendants, and the PCF rescinded its notice of insufficiency of the 
filing fee.73 However, the trial court granted the remaining 
defendant’s subsequent exception of prescription, and the Third 
Circuit affirmed.74 The appellate court reasoned that the language of 
the statute regarding filing fees is clear: A filing fee of $100 per 
named defendant must be paid within 45 days.75 Because the 
plaintiff did not pay the correct filing fee prior to the 45-day 
deadline, the initial claim was deemed invalid and insusceptible of 
interrupting prescription.76  
IV. EXPERT WITNESSES AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
Expert testimony is almost always necessary for a plaintiff to 
meet his burden in a medical malpractice case.77 For this reason, the 
filing of a “no expert motion for summary judgment” by a 
defendant–healthcare provider is all but inevitable in cases where a 
plaintiff has neglected to retain a qualified expert. Therefore, issues 
related to expert witnesses, especially in the context of a motion for 
summary judgment, are a pivotal area of medical malpractice law. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently issued a key holding in 
this area of the law in the case of Benjamin v. Zeichner.78 There, the 
Court determined that the plaintiffs’ expert did not meet the expert 
witness qualifications set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:2794(D) and entered a directed verdict for the defense.79 Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:2794 lists four mandatory requirements 
for experts: They must (1) be practicing medicine at the time of 
testimony or at the time the claim arose; (2) have knowledge of the 
standard of care; (3) be qualified based on training and experience; 
                                                                                                             
 70. Rideaux, 2013 WL 811628, at *1. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at *2. 
 76. Id. at *3. 
 77. See Samaha v. Rau, 977 So. 2d 880 (La. 2008). But see Pfiffner v. Correa, 
643 So. 2d 1228 (La. 1994). 
 78. 113 So. 3d 197 (La. 2013). 
 79. Id. at 205. 
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and (4) be either licensed to practice medicine at the time of trial or 
a graduate of an accredited medical school.80 
The expert in Benjamin v. Zeichner had given up his licenses to 
practice medicine in Alabama and Louisiana prior to trial.81 
Defendants argued that because he was not licensed to practice in 
any jurisdiction in the United States at the time of trial and despite 
the fact that he was licensed and practicing at the time of the alleged 
negligence, the Tulane Medical School graduate was nevertheless 
unqualified because there was no competent evidence to prove that 
he met the requirement of section 9:2794(D)(1)(d), i.e., that he 
graduated from an “accredited medical school.”82 There was no 
question that the expert was a 1958 graduate of Tulane Medical 
School, but the trial court found no admissible evidence that Tulane 
was “accredited” by the American Medical Association’s Liaison 
Committee on Medical Education in 1958.83 The plaintiffs 
attempted to introduce a faxed letter from Tulane as to its 1958 
status, but the court ruled that the letter and its attachment were 
inadmissible hearsay.84 
The Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that although the expert 
had relinquished his medical licenses prior to trial, he had begun 
reviewing the evidence in the case before having done so.85 The 
Third Circuit further noted that the expert’s affidavit was signed in 
2004, years before he relinquished his licenses.86 The Supreme 
Court granted writs and acknowledged that of the four mandatory 
requirements of section 9:2794(D)(1), it was undisputed that the 
expert met the first three, i.e., he was practicing at the time of the 
claim, had knowledge of the standard of care, and was qualified 
based on training and experience.87 The issue was whether the 
plaintiffs proved that the expert was either licensed to practice 
medicine at the time of trial or was a graduate of an accredited 
medical school in satisfaction of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:2794(D)(1)(d).88 The Supreme Court found that the evidence did 
not conclusively establish that Tulane was accredited at the time of 
trial and that the court could not “assume accreditation” based solely 
                                                                                                             
 80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794 (2009). 
 81. Benjamin, 113 So. 3d at 200. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 200–01. 
 86. Id. at 201–03. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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on the fact that the expert was licensed to practice in Louisiana in 
1959.89 The Supreme Court reinstated the directed verdict.90 
In Albers v. Vina Family Medicine Clinic,91 the Fourth Circuit 
held that an expert affidavit filed in opposition to a no-expert motion 
for summary judgment was insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact.92 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant–physician 
prescribed narcotic medication to the decedent at two pain clinics, 
allegedly causing her addiction to pain medication and ultimately 
her death.93 Plaintiffs filed a PCF complaint in June 2006; however, 
no evidence was ever submitted to the panel and that proceeding 
expired in three years.94 Plaintiffs thereafter filed a post-panel 
petition in July 2009.95 The defendant “filed an exception of 
prescription which the trial court denied on contra non valentem 
grounds due to Hurricane Katrina and its devastating effects.”96 At 
the hearing on the exception, counsel for the plaintiffs advised the 
court that all records from the clinics where the decedent allegedly 
received her medication were lost in Hurricane Katrina “and that the 
only records he had to prove his case were certain Medicaid 
prescription records.”97 
The defendant later propounded written discovery seeking the 
identity of any expert witnesses.98 After receiving no response, the 
defendant filed a no-expert motion for summary judgment.99 The 
motion was filed more than 7 years after the decedent’s death and 17 
months after the hearing on the exception of prescription.100 The 
court granted the plaintiffs a continuance and reset the motion for 
hearing four months after it was filed.101 Two days before the 
hearing, the plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum and attached 
the affidavit of a specialist in medical toxicology.102 The affidavit 
stated that the expert relied on the Recipient Data Sheet from the 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Bureau of Health 
Services Financing, Medicaid Management Information Services, 
the death certificate, an autopsy protocol, an unverified letter from 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. at 204. 
 90. Id. at 204–05. 
 91. 116 So. 3d 940 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2013). 
 92. Id. at 943. 
 93. Id. at 941. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 942. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals providing the 
defendant’s physician identification number and identifying the 
defendant as a prescribing provider of the decedent, and an affidavit 
from the decedent’s children.103 The plaintiffs contended that these 
documents established that the decedent filled multiple prescriptions 
for narcotic medication, that some of these prescriptions were filled 
under the defendant’s physician identification number, and that the 
decedent filled prescriptions or attempted to fill prescriptions 
allegedly written by the defendant on several dates over a seven-
month period.104 They further argued that the autopsy protocol 
showed massive amounts of drugs in the decedent’s body and that 
the death certificate showed that she died secondary to multiple drug 
ingestion.105 
The trial court considered the untimely opposition but ultimately 
found that the plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony sufficient 
to support a breach of the standard of care.106 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that the expert affidavit merely stated conclusions 
regarding the medication allegedly prescribed but failed to establish 
that the defendant was the physician who actually prescribed the 
medication or that several prescriptions allegedly written by him 
were enough to establish a breach in the standard of care.107 The 
appellate court further noted that the expert affidavit failed to 
establish that the prescriptions allegedly prescribed by the defendant 
caused or contributed to the decedent’s death.108 The Supreme Court 
denied writs.109 
In Robin v. Hebert,110 the Third Circuit held that determining 
whether a defendant inappropriately prescribed Xanax and clinically 
caused the patient’s death are complex medical issues that require 
expert evidence.111 The court disregarded the plaintiffs’ argument 
that they should be allowed to prove the applicable standard by 
relying on the product labeling for Xanax and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the physician.112 The Third Circuit affirmed.113  
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 943. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 943–44. 
 107. Id. at 944. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Albers v. Vina Family Med. Clinic, 123 So. 3d 1211 (La. 2013). 
 110. No. 12−147, 2013 WL 1809821 (La. Ct. App. 3d May 1, 2013). 
 111. Id. at *6–8. 
 112. Id. at *6. 
 113. Id. at *8. 
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In Jackson v. Suazo-Vasquez,114 the trial court rejected an 
affidavit of a nursing expert that was submitted in opposition to a 
no-expert motion for summary judgment.115 Plaintiff filed a claim 
against a physician and a dialysis center alleging that they breached 
the standard of care when they failed to send his mother to the 
hospital after she received dialysis and experienced an episode of 
high blood pressure.116 Shortly after leaving the dialysis center, the 
patient became nonresponsive and eventually died.117 The medical 
review panel found for the defendants, who thereafter filed a motion 
for summary judgment in the post-panel proceeding.118 In 
opposition, the plaintiff submitted the expert affidavit of a nurse.119 
The court found the affidavit insufficient to refute the panel opinion 
because the nurse could not address the fault of the defendant–
nephrologist or the issue of whether the alleged malpractice caused 
the patient’s death.120 The court granted summary judgment, and the 
First Circuit affirmed.121  
V. DAMAGES AND LOST CHANCE 
Another critical issue in medical malpractice cases is the 
question of what type of damages are recoverable by the injured 
plaintiff. A frequently litigated issue in this area is the “lost chance” 
theory of recovery. Because medical malpractice cases often involve 
difficult questions of causation, years ago plaintiffs began urging 
courts to define the victim’s injury as a loss of a chance of survival 
(or recovery) in cases that posed significant cause-in-fact barriers. 
Louisiana courts have largely embraced this creative theory of 
recovery. 
Under a lost chance theory, the plaintiff need not prove that the 
patient would have survived or recovered but for the defendant’s 
malpractice; however, the plaintiff must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she had a chance of 
survival and that this chance was lost due to the defendant’s 
negligence.122 The Supreme Court has emphasized that in such 
cases, the fact-finder must focus on the lost chance as a distinct, 
                                                                                                             
 114. 116 So. 3d 773 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2013). 
 115. Id. at 778. 
 116. Id. at 774–75. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 777–79. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Hebert v. Parker, 796 So. 2d 19, 27 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2001). See also Snia 
v. Med. Ctr. of New Orleans, 637 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994). 
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compensable injury and value the lost chance as a lump sum award 
based on all the evidence in the record, as is done for any other item 
of general damages.123 “The lost chance of survival in professional 
malpractice cases has a value in and of itself that is different from 
the value of a wrongful death or survival claim.”124 
In one recent decision addressing the lost chance theory, the 
Second Circuit held that a plaintiff may not recover wrongful death 
damages and damages for loss of a chance of survival.125 The court 
held that in cases where it is questionable to what extent the 
defendant’s negligence contributed to the death, a plaintiff must 
prove the patient had more than a 50% chance of survival in order to 
recover wrongful death damages.126 
In Coody v. Barraza, a jury awarded $250,000 for loss of a 
chance of survival for a seven-month delay in diagnosing recurrent 
ovarian cancer, despite the fact that only one out of five experts 
testified that the defendant breached the standard of care.127 The 
patient died before trial but had previously stated that she was 
“devastated, sick and scared” after finding out about the 
misdiagnosis and that she had lost faith in her doctors.128 She also 
suffered four years of deterioration and three years of chemotherapy 
before her death.129 The patient was survived by three children and a 
husband of 47 years, with whom she had close relationships.130 The 
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s award, finding a reasonable 
factual basis to determine that the defendant’s breach caused a loss 
of chance of a better outcome or longer survival based on evidence 
that 10% of recurrent ovarian cancer patients experience a second 
remission.131 The court deemed irrelevant the fact that there was no 
proof that the patient fell into that 10% or that she would have been 
cured of her cancer with an earlier diagnosis.132 
Another issue of damages in medical malpractice cases is that of 
future medical expenses. Under the MMA, in all malpractice claims 
that proceed to trial, the jury is given a special interrogatory asking 
whether the plaintiff is in need of future medical care and related 
                                                                                                             
 123. Smith v. State, Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996). 
 124. Id. at 548. 
 125. Bolton v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., No. 47,923–CA, 2013 WL 1748543 
(La. Ct. App. 2d Apr. 4, 2013). 
 126. Id. at *18–19. 
 127. 111 So. 3d 485, 493 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013). 
 128. Id. at 488–89. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 490–92. 
 132. Id. 
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benefits and the amount thereof.133 Under the MMA, “future” 
medical expenses are actually defined as all medical expenses and 
are not subject to the cap.134 In one recent decision, the Fourth 
Circuit held that future medical expenses need not be established by 
expert physician testimony.135 A plaintiff may establish future 
medical expenses through the testimony of an expert in vocational 
rehabilitation counseling and life care planning, paired with 
testimony of a forensic accountant to calculate the present value of 
the medical expenses.136  
VI. INFORMED CONSENT 
In addition to the typical negligence medical malpractice claim, 
Louisiana law also recognizes a cause of action for a physician’s 
failure to adequately disclose the risks and hazards involved in the 
medical care to be provided, also known as the failure to obtain 
informed consent.137 The informed consent doctrine is based on the 
principle that “every human being of adult years and sound mind 
has a right to determine what shall be done to his or her own 
body”;138 therefore, when circumstances permit, 
a patient should be told the nature of the pertinent ailment or 
condition, the general nature of the proposed treatment or 
procedure, the risks involved in the proposed treatment or 
procedure, the prospects of success, the risks of failing to 
undergo any treatment or procedure at all, and the risks of 
any alternate methods of treatment.139  
                                                                                                             
 133. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.43 (2008). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Cooper v. Bouchard Transp., Nos. 2012–CA–0868, 2012–CA–0869, 
2012–CA–0870, 2012–CA–0871, 2013 WL 1247707 (La. Ct. App. 4th Mar. 27, 
2013). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39.5(D) (2012) (“In a suit against a 
physician or other health care provider involving a health care liability or medical 
malpractice claim which is based on the failure of the physician or other health 
care provider to disclose or adequately to disclose the risks and hazards involved 
in the medical care or surgical procedure rendered by the physician or other health 
care provider, the only theory on which recovery may be obtained is that of 
negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards that could have influenced a 
reasonable person in making a decision to give or withhold consent.”). 
 138. Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So. 3d 922, 930 (La. 2013). 
 139. Id. (citing Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411 (La. 1988) 
(on rehearing)). 
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In a lack of informed consent case, the plaintiff must prove: 
(1) The existence of a material risk unknown to the patient; 
(2) A failure to disclose a risk on the part of the physician;  
(3) That the disclosure of the risk would have led a 
reasonable patient in the patient’s position to reject the 
medical procedure or choose another course of treatment; 
and 
(4) Injury.140 
These jurisprudential principles have been codified in 
Louisiana’s Uniform Consent Law, which provides three 
approaches under which a healthcare provider may obtain informed 
consent.141 First, a healthcare provider may provide a written 
consent form that explains the risks of the procedure and requires 
the patient’s written consent.142 Second, a healthcare provider may 
deliver the same information and obtain the patient’s consent orally 
or by a method “other than” a writing.143 Third, a healthcare 
provider may provide one of various “lists” created by the Medical 
Disclosure Panel, an entity within the Department of Health and 
Hospitals, which is responsible for determining “which risks and 
hazards related to medical care and surgical procedures must be 
disclosed by a physician or other health care provider to a patient or 
person authorized to consent for a patient and establish the general 
form and substance of such disclosure.”144 If a healthcare provider 
utilizes the lists prepared by the Medical Disclosure Panel in the 
manner set forth under the Uniform Consent Law, the patient’s 
signature will create a rebuttable presumption that valid consent was 
given.145 
The Uniform Consent Law was revised in 2012.146 The new 
version of the law contains various revisions, most of which relate to 
the administrative reorganization of the Medical Disclosure Panel. 
Other relevant revisions include deleting the phrase “handwritten 
consent” from former Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id. (citing Brandt v. Engle, 791 So. 2d 614, 618 (La. 2001)). 
 141. For a more in-depth discussion of the operation of the three approaches, 
see Snider, 130 So. 3d at 931–32. 
 142. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.39.5(A) (2012). 
 143. See id. § 40:1299.39.5(C). 
 144. See id. § 40:1299.39.6. 
 145. Id. § 40:1299.39.6(O)(1)(a). 
 146. Previously, the Uniform Consent Law was found in former Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.40, which was repealed and reenacted as 
Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.39.5, 40:1299.39.6, and 40:1299.39.7 
by Act No. 759, § 2, 2012 La. Acts 3086–3100. The new statute was effective 
June 12, 2012. 
2014] LOUISIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE  889 
 
 
 
40:1299.40(A)(1) and replacing it with “the voluntary permission of 
a patient, through signature, marking, or affirmative action through 
electronic means pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.40.1.”147 
The Fourth Circuit recently held that in an informed consent 
case, a plaintiff may not introduce the testimony of a defendant’s 
former patients regarding whether the physician informed or failed 
to inform them of the risks involved in the particular procedure at 
issue to establish evidence of habit.148 Such testimony is 
inadmissible character evidence of other similar acts.149 However, if 
the doctor testifies about what he or she told “each and every one” 
of his or her patients, a former patient may provide rebuttal 
evidence.150 
Under the recent holding of Roberts v. Marx,151 a surgeon is not 
required to disclose his or her own possible impairments to obtain 
informed consent.152 In Roberts, one week after undergoing a retinal 
detachment repair surgery, a surgeon performed a vasectomy that 
resulted in complications.153 The patient alleged that the surgeon 
violated informed consent law by failing to inform him of the risks 
associated with the surgeon’s possible impairment.154 The medical 
review panel found that the surgeon had no obligation to disclose his 
recent eye surgery to the plaintiff.155 The trial court later granted the 
surgeon’s motion for summary judgment, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed, reasoning that a doctor’s duty of disclosure to a patient 
includes only those risks that are material and this was not a material 
risk.156 Significantly, the surgeon’s eye doctor indicated that the 
surgeon could return to work.157 Moreover, the surgeon’s slight 
deficiency in eyesight affected only one eye, and the plaintiff failed 
to present expert evidence regarding any effect on the surgeon’s 
vision when aided by the surgical magnification instrument.158 
In Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., the 
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s verdict and overruled the 
Third Circuit’s finding that a signed consent form was insufficient to 
constitute informed consent.159 In that case, the plaintiff, who had a 
                                                                                                             
 147. § 40:1299.39.5(A). 
 148. Joseph v. Williams, 105 So. 3d 207, 219–20 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2012). 
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personal and family history of heart trouble, filed suit against a 
physician for implanting a pacemaker under allegedly emergent 
conditions that was later determined to be unnecessary.160 The 
physician told the then 26-year-old patient, who was suffering from 
chest pain and a low pulse rate, that he could not be transferred to 
another hospital to see his regular cardiologist because the 
placement of the pacemaker was an emergency.161 The medical 
review panel found that the physician breached the standard of care 
because he rushed the decision for implantation.162 However, at trial, 
the jury found in favor of the defendant–physician despite expert 
testimony that the plaintiff’s condition was neither critical nor 
emergent.163 
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the Snider plaintiff did 
not give informed consent for the procedure because the consent 
form failed to disclose the risks of the patient’s medical conditions 
(including the effects of his current medications), the reasonable 
therapeutic alternatives and the risks associated with those 
alternatives, and the plaintiff’s immediate condition that necessitated 
the emergent procedure, all of which were critical to his decision-
making process.164 Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the 
physician’s failure to comply with all of the requirements of former 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.40(E)(3)(a),165 which 
required disclosure of risks and hazards identified by the Louisiana 
Medical Disclosure Panel, constituted a lack of informed consent as 
a matter of law.166 Significantly, the portions of the consent form 
labeled for this information were left blank.167 
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs, reversed the Third 
Circuit, and reinstated the trial court’s verdict.168 The Court first 
noted that the court of appeal was misguided in focusing only on 
subsection (E) of former Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40:1299.40, which enumerated only one method of obtaining 
                                                                                                             
 160. Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 129 So. 3d 61, 62–63 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2013).  
 161. Id. at 62. 
 162. Id. at 63. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 68–69. 
 165. The substance of former Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40:1299.40(E)(3)(a) now appears in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40:1299.39.6(B)(1). 
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informed consent.169 It noted that the jury instructions given by the 
district court judge 
corresponded more with an evaluation of compliance with 
the requirements of Subsections (A) or (C) (which require 
that the physician or health care provider advise the patient 
of the nature and purpose of the procedure and the known 
risks associated with the procedure of death, brain damage, 
quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any 
organ or limb, and/or of disfiguring scars).170 
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit’s 
focus should have been on the jury’s findings of fact regarding what 
the physician actually told the patient, not on what the informed 
consent form disclosed pursuant to subsection (E).171 The Court held 
that a manifest error standard of review was appropriate for that 
question, giving great deference to the jury’s findings.172 Under this 
standard, the Court held that there was ample evidence based on the 
testimony at trial to support the jury’s findings.173 
VII. MEDICAL REVIEW PANELS 
Another common source of litigation in Louisiana medical 
malpractice law is the MMA’s requirement that plaintiffs submit 
their claims to a medical review panel before suit may be filed.174 
The medical review panel is charged with rendering an expert 
opinion as to whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the 
defendant or defendants acted or failed to act within the appropriate 
standards of care.175 After reviewing all evidence, the panel must 
render one or more of the following expert opinions with written 
reasons for their conclusions: (1) the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to comply with 
the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint; (2) the 
evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant or 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id. at 937–38. Again, the substance of former Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 40:1299.40(E)(3)(a) now appears in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40:1299.39.6(B)(1). 
 170. Snider, 130 So. 3d at 937–38. The substance of former Louisiana Revised 
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defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged 
in the complaint; (3) there is a material issue of fact, not requiring 
expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court.176 
If the panel decides that the defendant or defendants breached the 
standard of care, then the panel must decide whether the conduct 
complained of was a factor of the resultant damages and, if so, 
whether the plaintiff suffered: (1) any disability and the extent and 
duration of the disability and (2) any permanent impairment and the 
percentage of the impairment.177 
Each medical review panelist is required to take an oath that he 
or she will perform the duties without partiality or favoritism.178 The 
MMA also requires panelists to disclose in writing prior to the panel 
hearing any employment relationship or financial relationship with 
the parties or their attorneys.179 Finally, the MMA provides that any 
report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review panel 
shall be admissible as evidence in any post-panel lawsuit.180 
In Fanguy v. Lexington Insurance Co.,181 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court recently held that a medical review panel member’s failure to 
disclose a conflict of interest invalidated the panel opinion, but the 
Court ordered a new panel proceeding rather than simply excluding 
the panel opinion and testimony of the panel physicians.182 In that 
case, neither the defendant–physician nor the panelist disclosed the 
fact that they were officers of the same medical corporation.183 The 
panel found in favor of the defendant–physician, and at trial, the 
plaintiff moved to exclude the panel opinion as well as the 
testimony of all three panelists.184 The trial court granted the motion 
to exclude the offending panelist’s testimony but denied the motion 
to exclude the panel opinion or testimony of the two other panel 
members.185 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal granted writs and 
excluded the panel opinion and testimony of all three panelists, 
reasoning that the entire panel was tainted.186 In a per curiam 
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
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remanding the matter to the district court pending a new panel 
proceeding.187 The Court reasoned: 
While we are unable to say the lower courts committed error 
in finding that the undisclosed financial relationship between 
Dr. Carriere and Dr. Graham presented the appearance of 
impropriety, which vitiated Dr. Carriere’s oath of impartiality 
and thereby tainted the MRP [medical review panel]  
proceedings, we believe that justice would best be served by 
ordering the re-constitution of the MRP with different 
physician members and allowing that new panel to 
deliberate and issue an opinion on the issues presented in 
this case.188  
VIII. STANDARD OF CARE 
Pivotal to almost every medical malpractice case is a 
determination of the standard of care applicable to a healthcare 
provider. Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:2794(A), 
a plaintiff bears the burden of proving (1) the standard of care 
applicable to the healthcare provider, (2) whether the healthcare 
provider breached that standard of care, and (3) whether any breach 
of the standard of care by the healthcare provider proximately 
caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries that would not otherwise have 
been incurred.189 
In Schilling v. Aurich,190 the Third Circuit found that the trial 
court erred in granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict where a jury found a breach of the standard of care by a 
psychologist who conducted only a phone interview with a patient, 
rather than a face-to-face examination, prior to issuing a physician’s 
emergency certificate.191 The defendant–psychologist in Schilling 
had a long-standing physician–patient relationship with the plaintiff 
and was familiar with her history.192 The plaintiff was involuntarily 
committed to psychiatric care by the defendant on the day of her 17-
year-old son’s funeral at which her husband removed his wedding 
band, placed it on their deceased son’s hand, and announced to the 
plaintiff that their marriage was over.193 At the insistence of the 
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plaintiff’s friends and family, the defendant executed a physician’s 
emergency certificate without first conducting a face-to-face 
examination.194 The psychologist testified that he did speak with the 
plaintiff on the evening of her commitment via telephone, during 
which she indicated that she wanted to go “home” with her son, was 
“done with everything,” and was going to crash her car or take 
pills.195 However, an expert psychologist and member of the 
medical review panel testified that Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 28:53(B)(1)’s requirement of an “actual” examination 
requires an in-person examination before a person can be 
involuntarily committed.196 He further testified that it was a breach 
of the standard of care to conduct a phone interview rather than an 
in-person examination.197 
In another recent decision, the Fourth Circuit found that there 
was no reasonable basis for a medical review panel opinion on 
which the trial court relied and reversed the judgment in favor of the 
defendant–healthcare provider.198 
Recent decisions have also spoken to the standard of care that is 
applicable to hospitals. One recent case noted that hospitals are held 
to a national standard of care; the locality rule does not apply.199 In 
another recent case, the Fourth Circuit held that a hospital may be 
liable for negligence independent of any negligence of its employees 
when the governing board of the hospital fails to select its 
employees with reasonable care, furnish the hospital with 
reasonably adequate supplies, equipment, and facilities for use in the 
treatment and diagnosis of its patients, or provide adequate 
procedure for maintaining the safety of its grounds and buildings.200 
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 195. Id. at 588. 
 196. Id. at 586. 
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 198. In re Brown, No. 2011-CA-1824, 2013 WL 633101 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
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awarded $65,000 in general damages. Id. at *6. 
 199. Richardson v. Christus Schumpert Health Sys., 110 So. 3d 264 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2013). 
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IX. THE PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND 
Another complex issue that often faces medical malpractice 
litigants is the involvement of the PCF, which may become a party 
to the litigation once there has been a judgment of liability or a 
settlement. Under the MMA, a plaintiff’s damages in excess of 
$100,000 may be recovered from the PCF, but any such damages 
may not exceed $500,000. Further, once a healthcare provider has 
admitted liability up to the statutory maximum of $100,000, the PCF 
cannot contest liability when there is a binding settlement for 
$100,000 by the healthcare provider, either before or after 
trial.201  At that point, the only remaining issue is the damages, if 
any, owed by the PCF.202 However, the court must approve the 
settlement, and the PCF must be given notice and an opportunity to 
object to the settlement.203 
In one recent decision, the court held that a medical malpractice 
claimant seeking excess damages from the PCF was subject to the 
notice requirements set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
40:1299.44(C). If the claimant fails to provide the required notice 
via service of a copy of the Petition for Approval ten days before its 
filing, the claimant does not have a cause of action against the PCF 
for excess damages.204 
Another recent decision recognized that the PCF cannot stop 
future medical expense payments without a court order, despite a 
change in the plaintiff’s circumstances.205 In that case, a child who 
suffered a stroke in utero was awarded future medical expenses.206 
In conjunction with that award, the trial court ordered the PCF to 
make quarterly advanced payments of custodial care expenses to a 
trust in the child’s name for 24-hour care, accessible by his mother 
                                                                                                             
 
hospital did not follow its procedure to have a detailed summary of the patient’s 
admission history dictated and transcribed until two weeks after the patient’s 
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 202. Id. 
 203. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44 (2008). 
 204. Howard v. Mamou Health Res., No. 12-820, 2013 WL 811676 (La. Ct. 
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who was providing care for him.207 Years later, the PCF learned that 
the child, now a grown man, was married and no longer living with 
his mother.208 The PCF discontinued payments and requested an 
Independent Medical Examination.209 The trial court held, and the 
Third Circuit affirmed, that a change in the claimant’s condition did 
not allow the PCF to make a unilateral decision to cease 
payments.210 The PCF was required to first obtain a ruling 
modifying the prior judgment before discontinuing the payments.211 
In Buras v. Deloach, et al., the PCF’s exceptions of no cause 
and no right of action to a Petition for Settlement Approval with 
reservation of rights against the PCF were held to be properly 
overruled where the plaintiffs’ allegations of improper prescription 
of narcotic medication without proper treatment and counseling 
unquestionably articulated a valid cause of action in medical 
malpractice.212 The PCF urged the court to pierce the allegations of 
the petition and craft an unpled intentional tort arising from a 
purported criminal enterprise with quid pro quo business 
transactions rather than actual medical treatment.213 The Fourth 
Circuit strictly applied the Coleman v. Deno214 factors and refused 
to accept the PCF’s arguments.215 
The Fourth Circuit also found that the PCF’s exception of 
prematurity to the Petition for Settlement Approval was properly 
overruled because, despite the fact that the defendant–healthcare 
providers did not file an answer within ten days of the filing of the 
settlement petition, the answer had been filed by the time the trial 
court approved the settlement.216 
The Fourth Circuit also found that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to include the plaintiffs’ collateral voluntary dismissal of 
two non-settling healthcare providers in the settlement-approval 
judgment.217 “[T]here is no statutory provision that requires a 
judgment approving a settlement agreement with one healthcare 
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provider to include information about collateral agreements with 
other providers in the judgment.”218 
  
                                                                                                             
 218. Id. This matter was brought to the Fourth Circuit on appeal and alternative 
application for supervisory writs. The Fourth Circuit granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss appeal, granted the writ to the docket, and after oral argument, 
denied the writ with written reasons. 
